stocks so that a portfolio has the desired beta ( 5 ). One method (discussed by Blume [3] ) would be to form a portfolio comprising a large number of stocks having betas approximately equal to the desired level. Large portfolios are suggested because there is évidence that individùal betas are unstable [4] , though Bey [2] found that only a minority of stocks had unstable betas. But Blume and Friend [5] have reported that a large proportion of portfolios are undiversified. Even so, as early as 1975, 17% of individuals assessed risk in terms of beta. The method suggested by Blume [3] of achieving a target beta is obviously impractical for these portfolios.
Taking another approach, a number of authors have investigated using accounting information and other fundamental characteristics of the firm to predict betas [7, 12, 16 to 19] . In a recent study of this type, Hill and Stone [7] developed a method which involves decomposing the accounting measures of systematic risk into components representing both financial and operating risk. Hill and Stone concluded that "forecasts of future market betas can be significantly improved if one can predict future financial structure and operating risk" ( [7] , p. 629). While they show promise as methods for controlling portfolio betas, the usefulness of techniques such as that of Hill and Stone are limited by (1) the need for better models of the relationship between market betas and the characteristics of the firm and (2) the requirement for considérable amounts of accounting data.
This paper addresses the problem of selecting stocks for a small portfolio so as to achieve a target beta. Some might argue that undiversified portfolios should be concerned with unsystematic risk more than with systematic risk. Nevertheless, we feel that there is suf f icient justification for the work presented hère. Despite theoretical objections, many individùal investors holding undiversified portfolios undoubtedly seek to achieve a target beta. Further, we indicate below how unsystematic risk may be incorporated into the model, at least indirectly.
In our approach to selecting a portfolio to achieve a target beta, we make no assumption concerning the attribution of the uncertainty of a security's beta. We only note that this uncertainty exists because beta is a random variable, and that this uncertainty can be measured using standard sfatistical measures. Barry [1] has shown that uncertainty concerning portfolio risk/return parameters can affect optimal portfolio choice. We develop a model for finding the optimal portfolio of size k among a finite universe of stocks of size n where k^n. Among all the portfolios k having the desired beta, we ( 5 ) Kalymon investigated the problem of assessing portfolio variance when the true values of the parameters of the return distributions are unknown. But no attempt was made to détermine optimal portfolios nor was the analysis extended to systematic risk.
PORTFOLIO SELECTION TO ACHIEVE A TARGET BETA 133 define the optimal portfolio to be the portfolio which has the smallest variance of portfolio bèta. Our justification for this criterion is that a portfolio with minimum variance of bèta is also the portfolio that minimizes any différence between realized and target bèta.
Selecting a portfolio with this criterion suggests a number of related questions. First, as the number of stocks in the portfolio is increased, what is the rate of decrease in the variance of the optimal portfolio bèta? If the variance of bèta for small optimal portfolios is large and decreases slowly as portfolio size is increased, then large portfolios may be necessary to insure that a portfolio has a desired bèta. But if the variance of the betas of small portfolios is small or if the rate of decrease in the variance as stocks are added to the portfolio is great» then a portfolio with a desired bèta can be obtained with a small but properly selected group of stocks. Second, what is the shape of the distribution of the variance of portfolio betas for various portfolio sizes? If the distribution is heavy tailed, the implication is that systematic methods of portfolio construction must be employed if an investor wishes to be confident of achieving a portfolio bèta near his target. Third, do optimal portfolios generally contain securities whose estimated betas have the smallest variance or securities with betas close to the desired portfolio bèta but having larger variances or is it some combination of small variance and cioseness to portfolio bèta that is important? An answer to this question might provide information useful in developmgs optimal portfolios from sets of securities larger than those considered in this study. Fourth* given that the bèta and the standard error of the bèta of the risk-free security are both zero, will the risk-free security always (or usually) appear in the optimal portfolio ? In the capital asset pricing model, unless only the market portfolio is held, the risk-free security is always included in an investment portfolio [6] ,
We address these questions in the remainder of the paper. In section II we describe the setting of this portfolio sélection probîem within capital market theory. We present the optimization model which allows the achievement of a minimum variance portfolio for a particular target in section III. In section IV, the numerical results are presented and discussed. À summary is given in section V» where R t is the holding period return (HPR) on the i-th security, R f is the risk-free rate, and R m is the HPR on the market. Beta (P f ) is a measure of the security or portfolio's systematic risk. Defining r im as the coefficient of corrélation between the return on security i and the return on the market, and cr, and a m as the standard déviation of the security and market return, respectively, Pi = (r im cr I )/a m . Systematic risk is risk that a security shares with the market whiîe unsystematic risk is unique to a particular security. Standard déviation is a measure of total risk (systematic plus unsystematic). The coefficient of corrélation (r im ) can be interpreted as the percentage of the security's risk that is systematic. Thus, beta is a measure of the amount of systematic risk for a security relative to the amount of systematic risk for the market (which has only systematic risk).
Suppose that an investor sélects a target beta for his portfolio (P p ), where:
in which a u a 2 , . . ., a k are the portfolio weights (i. e., the percentage of the funds that are invested in the i-th security -note that we do not allow these weights to be négative) and P l5 f) 2 , . .
•, P* are the individual security betas. P p indicates the portfolio manager's risk tolérance. Our observation is that the naive choice of securities to reach a target P p fails to recognize that the variance of the realized (or ex post) p p can be controlled by a judicious sélection of the portfolio's component securities. In practice & is estimated using ordinary least squares. Because we are sampling from a population, the estimate of beta is a random variable subject to sampling error. Hence, if an investor proposes a target beta (p p ) of 1.5, the realized P p might differ greatly from 1.5. We wish to minimize the probability of any différence between target and realized beta.
Our objective is to choose a set of portfolio weights, a p i=l, 2, . . ., k which minimize the variance of P p ex ante, where:
The problem is cumbersome since there are a large number of portfolios of size k that can be chosen from a universe of n securities. And each of these portfolios must be optimally constructed.
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Note that the approach taken here is not to solve the classical Markowitz [11] portfolio problem in which a set of efficient (nondominated) portfolios is generated by specifying a particular risk or return level. In our formulation, we assume that all the relevant or market risk of a security is expressed by its bèta, which is the essence of Sharpe's [15] "diagonal" model. We further assume that the investor defines his risk préférence in terms of a bèta (P p ) for the entire portfolio. While ignoring unsystematic risk is strictly suitable only for well diversified portfolios, we argue that our approach has considérable practical appeal and, in addition, allows a number of insights into the problem of portfolio sélection to achieve a target bèta. Unsystematic risk may be incorporated into the model by the appropriate sélection of the candidate securities from which the portfolios ultimately are formed. More direct ways of incorporating unsystematic risk into the model represent an area for future research.
Bef ore the detailed présentation of the model in section III, it may be useful to give a brief example of the process being modeled. Suppose an investor seeks a two-security portfolio with a target bèta of one. Further, assume that these two securities will be selected from a list of candidate securities given in Appendix I (a). There are 91 potential portfolios, but only 49 of these have one security with a bèta above the target bèta and one with a bèta below.
If the investor sets a target bèta of 1, he can achieve that goal on an ex ante basis with any one of the 49 portfolios. But p p , taken ex post for these portfolios, may be substantially different. By finding optimal weights, a p for all 49 pairs of possible portfolios, the minimum a^p portfolio can be found by comparison. For this example, it can be shown that aj p has a minimum of .015, a maximum of . 139, and a Standard déviation of .023. For the minimum variance portfolio with ap p =.015> the 99% confidence interval, if sampling from a normal population, would be . 6325^ P p^ 1. 367. For the worst case, where af =0.139, this interval would be -0.118^P i7^2 .118. The advantage of the proper sélection and weights of individual securities is apparent.
III. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Let the portfolio weights be a p and the individual estimâtes be P y and oj.. for ail subsets of size fc = 2, 3, . . ., n. The overall minimum a| p portfolio is then found by comparison. While this approach may be theoretically inefficient, the development of a nonlinear, mixed integer programming algorithm to soive (1) over ail subsets of size k simuïtaneously would be cumbersome (?). Further, some of the questions addressed in the introduction require a détermination of the distributions of Op p for each /c, and solving (1) over all subsets simuïtaneously would not provide this évidence.
To solve (1), form the Lagrangian, Minimise :
differentiate with respect to the variables a u a 2? , . ., a k , X ls X 2 anc * simuïtaneously the remaining k -h 2 équations, When (2) is solved for ail subsets of size k> the minimum variance portfolio of size k is found by comparison. 
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We draw our candidate securities for the portfolios from a list given by Fama [6] , p. 123. Of his 30 securities, each described by a P, and a cjp., 14 are chosen by drawing random numbers from a uniform distribution [see Appendix I (a)]. These 14 securities comprise data set 1. To increase the diversity of the data used, three additional data sets were constructed from data set 1, as follows:
1. Data set 2: The first 13 securities in Appendix I (a) plus a risk-free security for which Pi 4 = 0, a pi4 = 0.
2. Data set 3: The last ten securities in I(a) plus four additional securities obtained by doubling the betas for securities 1-4 in Appendix I (a) and calculating revised a p . using the formula :
[This formula was obtained by régression analysis of data in I(a).] 3. Data set 4: The last ten securities in Appendix I(a) plus four additional securities obtained by halving the betas of securities 1-4 in Appendix I(a) and calculating revised cr p . using the formula in 2 above. Superior methods of choosing the list of candidate securities represent an area for future research.
To explain the computational difficulty and to défend our use of only 14 securities, recall that we wish to find the weights of each of the securities in the portfolio of size k that yield the target bèta, P p . We label a portfolio "admissible" if:
where % represent the individual security betas in the subset of size k of the set of n securities. An upper bound on the number of admissible portfolios of size k is obtained when the target bèta occupies the n/2 position in the set of ranked individual betas. This upper bound is:
and:
n/2\
/ n/2 \ }xl for n even,
for n odd, We solve (2) for every possible admissible portfolio of size fc = 2» 3, . . ., 6» and target beta (^=0.4, 1.0, 1.6) in each of the four data sets. We also find the cornbination of a fourteen security portfolio that minimizes trjj for each data set and target beta. Thus, our expérimental design is 6x3x4 (fc, p p , data set). Appendix II(a) and (b) contain some descriptive statistics for the distribution of &l p for each cell in this design. Note that for fc = 14, only one minimum a^ portfolio can be constructed, Recall from the introduction that there are four questions we wish to answer concerning the properties of portfolios constructed in this manner. These are: (1) What is the rate of decrease of the minimum a« as k increases? pp (2) What is the distribution of &l p for fixed k ? (3) What are the characteristics of securities included in the minimum af portfolio? and (4) What is the usefulness of a risk-free asset in the pool of candidate securities? We address these in turn.
The minimum a^ for each data set and target beta [see Appendix II (a)] reveal that of decreases asymptoticially as k increases, Previous research (see Wagner and Lau [20] ) indicates that diversification benefits in terms of réduction of total risk (i e. variance) leveled off as the number of securities in the portfolio reached ten to twelve. Our results are in terms of the variability of the systematic risk represented by beta and are, therefore, not directly comparable. But we also observe a "îeveling off' or asymptotic behavior of risk as a function of portfolio size.
One possible measure of the benefit of increased diversification is the width of a 99% confidence bound for the traget beta. This bound assumes P ( and, therefore, the linear combination p p is normally distributed, If this bound is such that beta is estimated to within say, ±25% of its value, then further diversification would be unnecessary. Using this arbitrary measure, our results indicate that portfolios of size 5 or 6 are sufficient And these results are achieved from a security population of size 14. If the security population is larger, the 5 or 6 security portfolio is an upper bound on the size required for maximum diversification benefits since more securities will allow more and, therefore, possibly better portfolios to be constructed.
The distributions of o\ p for particuîar k are described by the statistics given in Appendix II (a) and (&). These distributions allow us to détermine the value of solving(l) or (2) to find the minimum cr| portfolio, a time PORTFOLIO SELECTION TO ACHIEVE A TARGET BETA 139 consuming process at best. If the <jp were relatively close, an investor might only have to consider several combinations of k securities in constructing his portfolio. If the o\ p were widespread, some systematic and possibly costly (as in our formulation) method of portfolio construction must be employed. The statistics contained in the appendices reveal that the latter case is true; in many cells of the experiment design, the distributions are fat tailed and positively skewed. The exceptions occur usually when target p = 1.6, a situation in which few admissible portfolios exist ( .015 7) 1/2 or (0. 624, 1. 375). The distribution of o\ p is a Type I Pearson, or J shaped with heavy tails. Percentage points of the distribution can be found in tables given by Johnson, Nixon and Amos [8] , Using these tables, we can show that 99% confidence bounds on target beta=lbased on .10, .50, and . 90 percentiles of the distribution of ag p are respectively (0.571, 1.429), (0.522, 1.478), (0.350, 1. 650). The width of these bounds imply that the naive investor, even though optimally weighing the k securities he chooses, has a high probability of achieving a bèta substantially different from that planned.
Fortunately, an escape from the computational nightmare of enumeration can be found by investigating the composition of the minimum oj p portfolios. In all cases, two factors seem to be of importance. The first is plausible ; the <7p for an included security should be small. The second is known ; the betas of the included securities should be near the target bèta, which supports the claim of Blume [3] . Further analysis is neccssary to détermine explicitly the performance of these heuristic rules, especially in cases where there are tradeoff s between proximity to target bèta and the magnitude of o p . But given a large population of candidate securities, a target bèta, and a specified k, it ( 7 ) This is, of course, an artificial resuit since our population is comprised of 14 securities. Consider data set 1, with target bèta =1.6. Only 13 different portfolios can be constructed. is reasonable to assume that the investor will find a number of low a ? securities with bèta close to a target bèta. And large populations of candidate securities typify practical situations.
To illustrate our heuristic, consider the <sf for the securities in data set L The securities with the most variability are numbers 14, 1, 11, and 9 (in descending order). It is interesting to note that these securities never appear in the optimal portfolios we calculated.
For our second rule, namely that P x should be near the target bèta P p , the évidence is not so clear. Security # 12, with P 12 = r • 14» appears rather frequen» tly, which is consistent with our heuristic. ïn data set 4, where there was a surfeit of low bèta securities, security #7 (p 7 = 2. 24) appeared in every single portfolio (for P p = . 4, 1, and 1.6).
The effect of including a risk-free security (Py-Ö, &$.-0) in the candidate list is inconsistent. We find that the minimum crjj portfolio includes this security in several cases. More specifically, this security is included when fc = 6> target bèta=0.4 and when k=4, 5,6, target bèta =1.6. But, the numerical évidence is that the, risk-free security may not be included in the optimal portfolio. This finding is not consistent with capital market theory* If we consider the conclusions presented in the last section, this phenomenon can be explained by noting that while o^ = ö, the disadvantage of the distance of P=ö from the target bèta of 0.4, 1.0 or 1.6 may outweigh the advantage of the small varianoe in determinmg whether inclusion of this security in the portfolio is appropriate.
As a final point, we note that each minimum variance portfolio of size k is a subset of the portfolio of size k + v, u>\. This nesting phenomenon is not surprising given that some securities are, in a sensé, dominant with regard to having a small a^ and a (^ close to P r
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a model to select securities such that the variance of the bèta of the resulting portfolio is minimized, Our numerical results indicate that a small number of securities» say 5 or 6, will yield a portfolio enjoying the maximum benefits of diversification. But portfolios of this size should not be selected without care because we find that the distributions of the variances of target bèta for naively selected portfolios are positively skewed and have fat tails. An optimal solution can be found only if the investor is prepared to analyticaUy détermine the combination of securities that minimize the variance of target bèta. Fortunately, heuristic sélection rules show promise. Studying large numbers of optimal portfolios, we find that securities which are included typically have two properties: (1) a low standard déviation of bèta and (2) a bèta which is close to the target bèta. An interesting result is that when a risk-free security is available, it does not usually appear in the portfolio with minimum variance of bèta. 
